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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 17-1557 
___________ 
 
 
CHENG XI LI, 
                    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                                         Respondent 
 
_______________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
Agency No. A097-391-147 
(Immigration Judge: Honorable Steven A. Morley) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 September 20, 2017 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Opinion Filed: October 26, 2017) 
 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
Petitioner Cheng Xi Li petitions for review of a final order of removal. Li 
challenges the decisions of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture. Because 
substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Li did not demonstrate a well-founded 
fear of future persecution, we will deny the Petition for Review. 
  I. 
Petitioner Li is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China. The IJ set 
forth the history of this matter in his January 21, 2015 interlocutory decision [AR 352] 
and June 14, 2016 decision, [AR 67], and therefore we do not repeat it at length. 
This Petition arises from Li’s application for asylum on the basis of her conversion 
to Christianity and fear of religious persecution in China.1 An IJ conducted a hearing on 
the merits of Li’s application on June 23, 2015. Li waived direct examination, therefore 
the hearing involved a cross-examination of Li and the testimony of two witnesses, 
Reverend David R. Carey and Reverend Sue Czarnecki. [AR 282-302]. The IJ found Li 
to be a credible witness but denied her asylum application because she failed to establish 
                                              
1 Li first entered the United States on August 17, 2003, and has previously filed 
applications for asylum based on persecution under China’s family planning policies and 
her involvement in the pro-democracy movement. On remand from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the IJ determined that Li was no longer 
pursuing those claims and addressed only Li’s application for asylum on the basis of her 
fear of religious persecution. [AR 70]. Li did not appeal this determination to the BIA. 
[AR 4].   
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a reasonable likelihood of persecution were she to return to China. [AR 80-85]. The BIA 
affirmed on February 16, 2017, and Li timely filed this Petition for Review. 2 
II. 
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
Venue is proper because the proceedings before the IJ were concluded within this Circuit. 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). While we normally review the BIA’s decision, when the BIA 
substantially relies on the IJ’s reasoning, we may consider both the IJ’s and the BIA’s 
opinions. See, e.g., Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). 
Whether an asylum applicant has demonstrated a well-founded fear of future 
persecution is a factual question reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. See 
Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003). Under this “extraordinarily 
deferential standard,” Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 2003), 
findings will be upheld if they are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence on the record considered as a whole,” Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 
155 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). We 
reverse only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  
                                              
2 Li does not appeal, and has accordingly waived, the BIA’s determinations that: (1) she 
failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of persons similarly situated to her; 
(2) she is not entitled to protection under the Convention Against Torture; and (3) the 
forced clandestine practice of Christianity is itself a form of persecution. See United 
States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s 
failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on 
appeal.”).  
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III. 
Under the asylum statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, asylum is available at the discretion of 
the Attorney General for any alien who qualifies as a “refugee” as defined in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42)(A). Past persecution triggers a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded 
fear of future persecution. See Singh v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 191, 195–96 (3d Cir. 2005). 
Absent past persecution, the applicant bears the burden to establish a well-founded fear of 
persecution, “which encompasses threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic 
restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.” Yu v. Att’y Gen., 
513 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To 
demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution, an asylum applicant must 
demonstrate a subjectively genuine fear of persecution and “an objectively reasonable 
possibility of persecution.” Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 591 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
An applicant is entitled to withholding of removal if he or she “can satisfy the 
higher burden of demonstrating that it is more likely than not that life or freedom would 
be threatened because of a protected ground if he or she were removed.” Li v. Att’y Gen., 
400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005). An applicant who cannot demonstrate eligibility for 
asylum necessarily cannot qualify for withholding of removal. See Paripovic v. Gonzales, 
418 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2005).   
Li challenges the IJ’s and BIA’s determinations that she did not establish a 
well-founded fear of persecution and raises three issues in her Petition for Review: (1) 
whether the IJ and BIA erred in predicting Li would not attempt to proselytize were she 
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forced to return to China; (2) whether the BIA engaged in unauthorized factfinding 
concerning the likelihood of Li being persecuted were she to return to China; and (3) 
whether agency factfinding errors tainted other findings regarding the degree of harm Li 
would encounter in China. We address each in turn. 
A. 
We first consider Li’s argument that the IJ and BIA erred in finding she would not 
attempt to proselytize if removed to China. Li alleges that the IJ failed to address her 
written account of spreading the Gospel (particularly after he found her to be credible), 
sworn statements “from individuals with first-hand knowledge of Li’s proselytizing in the 
United States,” Pet’r’s Br. at 22, and a letter from the Brooklyn church Li first attended 
noting that she “led three persons to listen the Gospel at our church up to now,” id. at 24.   
Although the evidence Li raises supports her claim that she will proselytize upon 
return to China, nothing in the record as a whole compels this conclusion. The IJ’s 
findings explain that Li “attends church a couple times a month, but does not teach 
Sunday school, lead adult prayers, act as a lay leader, or even assume lay-leadership roles 
of an institutional, albeit not necessarily religious nature.” AR 81. This conclusion is 
substantially supported by evidence in the record. 
First, neither pastor who testified in support of Li stated she had proselytized in 
the United States. [AR 282-302]. For example, when asked whether Li engaged in 
activities of the church, Reverend Czarnecki stated only that “[s]he did some volunteer 
work for the church, and for our day school.” AR 298. Pastor Carey testified he knew Li 
only as “an acquaintance,” AR 289, and stated that his letter describing Li as a “regular 
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participant[] in the life of our church” was written “a while ago,” AR 290, and was not 
based on personal knowledge but “on the prior knowledge of the former pastor” 
Reverend Czarnecki, AR 291. Furthermore, Li herself admitted to attending church “once 
every two weeks,” AR 271, and spoke only of her intention to preach the Gospel in the 
future (i.e., upon return to China) during cross-examination. [AR 277].    
During Li’s hearing, the IJ acknowledged the “documentation in the record with 
regard to her involvement in church, and her involvement as an active Christian here in 
the United States.” AR 234. The IJ described the exhibits Li submitted in support of her 
application and referenced the evidence Li points to in her Petition.3 A more precise 
analysis in the IJ’s oral opinion would have addressed the sworn statements, but an IJ 
“need not discuss each and every piece of evidence presented by an asylum applicant 
when rendering a decision, as long as that decision is substantially supported.” Yan Lan 
Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 425 n.10 (3d Cir. 2005). As we have explained, “[w]e will 
not hold . . . that a [] decision is insufficient merely because its discussion of certain 
issues could have been more detailed.” Toussaint v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 414 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 
290 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, the record as a whole does not compel a 
conclusion that Li will preach the Gospel in China, particularly in light of the evidence 
emphasized by the IJ suggesting a lack of church leadership.  
                                              
3 The sworn statements from Meihui Huang and Yongchao Liu were submitted as Exhibit 
R17-T; the sworn statement from Wei Chen was submitted as Exhibit R7-I; and the letter 
from the pastor of the Brooklyn church Li first attended was submitted as Exhibit R4-D. 
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We also note the record reflects a careful consideration of the country conditions 
reports. These reports demonstrate that millions of Protestants practice in underground 
churches in China and local enforcement is inconsistent and sporadic. [AR 79-80]. The 
U.S. State Department’s 2013 International Religious Freedom Report for China, for 
example, states “[i]n parts of the country, local authorities tacitly approved of or did not 
interfere with the activities of some unregistered groups.” AR 573. And, while in other 
parts of the country local authorities restrict meetings, confiscate property, and detain 
worshippers, enforcement primarily focuses on church leaders. [AR 573]. This is 
particularly true in Fujian (the province where Li was born), where authorities primarily 
destroy property and target church leaders. [AR 479-483]. 
To secure asylum, there must be a serious threat to life or liberty. In Fatin, we 
explained the term “persecution” includes “threats to life, confinement, torture, and 
economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom,” and made 
clear that persecution refers only to “severe” conduct and “does not encompass all 
treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust or even unlawful or unconstitutional.” 
Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). As the IJ correctly noted, “isolated 
incidents that do not result in serious injury do not rise to the level of persecution.” Voci 
v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2005). 
Thus, the country conditions evidence further supports the IJ’s ultimate finding 
that Li did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. As the IJ reasoned, 
“if this record showed an escalating punishment, from a warning, to a brief detention, to a 
longer detention, to a reeducation camp where torture is common, the court could 
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conclude that a committed religious follower was at risk of persecution . . . . But that’s 
not the record in this case.” AR 84. We therefore hold the IJ’s decision supported by 
substantial evidence. 
B. 
We also hold the BIA did not engage in unauthorized factfinding concerning the 
likelihood of Li’s persecution upon return to China. Li argues the only way the BIA could 
uphold the IJ’s decision is to assign the sworn statements and letter from the Brooklyn 
church “limited or no weight.” Pet’r’s Br. at 26. And, she contends, “because weighing 
evidence is an essential aspect of fact-finding, this move by the Board, in an attempt to 
rehabilitate the IJ’s factfinding with factfinding of its own, is an error of law.” Id.  
Contrary to Li’s assertion, the BIA’s analysis of the IJ’s decision does not 
improperly weigh evidence. Instead, the BIA makes a legal conclusion that the evidence 
presented by Li did not establish clear error in the IJ’s finding. “[A] review of the factual 
record by the BIA does not convert its discretionary determination as to whether a 
petitioner warrants [relief] into improper factfinding.” Wallace v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 
135, 141 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Jianli Chen v. Holder, 703 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(“Although the BIA may not engage in independent factfinding, it has the prerogative—
indeed, the duty—of examining the basis for, and then synthesizing and analyzing, the 
IJ’s findings.”). 
C. 
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Because we find no error in the IJ’s factfinding and BIA’s decision, we need not 
address Li’s final argument that agency factfinding errors tainted other findings regarding 
the degree of harm Li would encounter in China. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the Petition for Review.   
